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60 RICHARDS V. STANLEY [43 C.2li 
(8. F. No. 18941. In Bank. June 11,1954.] 
ROBERT RICHARDS, Appellant, v. MANFRED STANLEY 
et ai., Respondents. 
[1] Negligence-Violation of Statute or Ordinance-PersoJUI In-
tended to be Beneflted.-A person may not recover damages 
based OD violation of a criminal statute or ordinance unless 
he is one of class of persons for whose benefit statute or ordi-
nance was enacted. 
[2] Automobiles-Evidence-Ordinances.-In action for personal 
injurIes sustamed when automobile driven by thief and owned 
by defendants struck motorcycle on which plaintiff was riding, 
ordinance requiring removal of ignition keys from noncom-
mercIal motor vehicle standing unattended in certain places is 
properly excluded as irrelevant. althougb complaint alleged 
that defendants' negligence in leaving vehicle "unattended 
and unlocked with the ignition key ,n said car lock" induced 
thief to take car, where ordinance specially provides that it 
shall have no bearing in any civil action, thereby making it 
olear that ordinance was not enacted. for benefit of persons 
who might be injured by operation of stolen automobiles. 
[3] Negligence-Elements-Duty to Person Injured.-An indis-
pensable factor to liability found~d on negligence is existence 
of a duty of care owed by alleged wrongdoer to person injured, 
or to class of which he is a mf'mber. 
[4] Automobiles-Persons Liable.-In absence of statute prohibit-
ing the leaving of key in an unattended vehicle on public street, 
owner ot automobile is ordinarily under no duty to persons 
who may be injured by its use to keep it out of hands of a third 
person in absence of facts putting owner on notice that third 
person is incompetent to handle it. 
[6] Id.-Persons Liable.-While there is a foreseeable risk of neg-
ligent driving whenever anyone drives himself or lends his 
ear to another, such risk 18 not considered so unreasonable that 
an owner is negligent merely because he drives himself or lends 
his car to another in absence of knowledge on his part of his 
own or the other's incompetence. 
[a] Negligence-Elements-Dnt}' to Third Person.-Ordinarily, in 
absence of a special relatIOnship between the parties, there is 
no duty to control conduct of a third person so as to prevent 
him from causing harm to another, and this rule is applicable 
[1] See Ca1.Jur., Negligence, § 66; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 165. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 92: [2] Automobiles, 
§ 208; [3, 6] N egIigence, § 5; [4, 5, 1] Automobiles, §159; [8] 
Negligence, I 150. 
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in eases in which third person's conduct is maue post;ible only 
because defendant has relinquished control of his property to 
third person, at least if defendant has no reason to believe 
that third person is incompetent to manage it. 
[71 Automobiles-Persons Liable.-In view of fact that risk of 
negligent drIving which automobile owner creates by leaving 
car unattended with ignitIOn key In car lock is less than risk 
she might intentionally have created without negligence by 
entrusting her car to another, and in view of rule that she owes 
no duty to protect plaintiff from harm resulting from activities 
of thIrd persons, her duty to exercise reasonable care in man· 
agement of her automobile does not encompass a duty to pro-
tect plaintiff from negligent driving of a thief. 
[81 Negligence-Questions of Law and Fact.-When existence of 
a duty rests on reasonable foreseeability of injury to plaintiff, 
it may become primarily a question for jury unless reasonable 
minds cannot differ, and necessarily involved in submitting 
ease to jury is a preliminary determinatioJl that, granted a 
foreseeable risk, a duty arises. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. L L. Harris, Judge. 
Affirmed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries arising out of a 
eollision of vehicles. Judgment of nonsuit affirmed. 
Frank J. Baumgarten and Harry N. Grover for Appellant. 
Clark & Heafey, Edwin A. Heafey, Gerald P. Martin and 
Belcher & Koller for Respondents. 
TRA YNOR, J.-Plaintitf brought this action to recover 
damages for personal injuries suffered when his motorcycle 
, collided with an automobile owned by defendants Mr. and Mrs. 
tStanley, which was being driven at the time by a thief, de-
fendant Rawlings. The complaint alleged that Mr. and Mrs. 
t .. r Stanley were the owners of an automobile, which Mrs. Stanley 
parked on Stevenson Street near Second Street in San Fran-
'cisco, leaving it "unattended and unlocked with the ignition 
. key in said car lock" in violation of section 69 of the municipal 
code ;. that as a result of this carelessness. defendant Rawlings 
~-'-------------------------------------------------
." See. 69. Requiring removal of iU"itioll key, from II011commercial 
" _~or vehicle standillg unattended ill certain places, authorizing officer. 
f.'P remove. No persoD shall leave a motor vehicle, except a commercial 
motor nhicle, uDattended OD aDJ' .treet, alley, used car lot, 01' unattended 
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"was thereby induced to and did enter said automobile and 
drove it from its parking place ••• into the intersection of 
Army Street and Potrero Avenue in a careless and negligent 
manner to the point of impact" with plaintiff's vehicle; that 
the accident occurred at about 5 :30 p. m. of said day when 
the Stanleys' car driven by Rawlings struck plaintiff as he 
was driving his motorcycle, throwing him to the pavement; 
and that "by reason of the premises and the aforesaid care-
lessness and negligence of the defendants and each of them, 
there was inflicted upon plaintiff serious personal injuries." 
The Stanleys' general demurrer was overruled, and they 
answered denying the allegations of the complaint and plead-
ing contribntory negligence. At the start of the trial plaintiff 
offered municipal code section 89 in evidence, but the trial 
conrt excluded it. Plaintiff then sought leave to amend his 
complaint to state a cause of action for general negligence, 
but leave to amend was denied. The court then sustained 
the Stanleys' objection to the introduction of any evidence 
against them on the ground that the complaint failed to state 
a eause of action and granted their motion for a nonsuit. 
Plaintiff has appealed. 
Although the ordinance provides that it shall not be admis-
sible in evidence or have any other bearing in any civil action, 
plaintiff contends that it may nevertheless be relied upon 
as a basis for liability. He bases this contention on the theory 
that a city ordinance may not validly control the rules of 
evidence applicable in the courts and that the provision pur-
porting to do so is severable from the remainder of the ordi-
nance. [1] A person may not recover damages based upon 
the violation of a criminal statute or ordinance, however, unless 
he is one of the class of persons for whose benefit the statute or 
ordinance was enacted. (Nunf&6Zey v. Edgar HoteZ, 36 Ca1.2d 
493, 497 [225 P.2d 497]; Routh v. Quinn, 20 Ca1.2d 488, 
491-492 [127 P.2d 1, 149 A.L.R. 215].) [2] By providing 
that the ordinance should have no bearing in any civil action, 
the board of supervisors made clear that the ordinance was 
parking lot, without llrat atopping the engine, ad removing and taking 
the ignition key from the vehicle; provided, however, that any violation 
of this section shall not mitigate the offense of Itealing ay luch motor 
vellicle; nor shall this section or any violation thereof be adruillible as 
evidence affecting recovery in any civil action for theft of IIl1ch motor 
vehicle, or the insurance thereon, or have any other bearing in any 
civil action. Whenever any police otllcer shall find any 8uch motor vehicle 
standing in violation of thil section, such police officer is authorized 
to remove therefrom the keys left therein Rnd deliver the same to the 
otlleer in char,e of the nearest police .tatioa." 
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not euaded r\)r the bellefit of 1)('rstlllS whll Il1i:~ht be injured 
by the operation of stuleu automobiles, and accordingly, 
whether or not it could validly affect the admissibility of 
evidence, it was properly excluded as irrelevant. 
Plaintiff contends that even if the ordinance is disregarded, 
his complaint states a cause of action for negligence against 
Mrs. Stanley. He relies on the allegations that as a result 
of her negligence and carelessness in leaving the car unattended 
on a public street with the key in it, Rawlings was induced 
to steal the ear, and that thereafter his negligent driving 
resulted in injuring plaintiff. It may be conceded at the 
outset that the leaving of the key in the car parked on a public 
street constituted negligence on the part of Mrs. Stanley 
toward her own and her husband's proprietary interests in the 
automobile, and that the intervening act of the thief in steal· 
ing the car would not insulate Mrs. Stanley from responsi. 
bility for her negligence toward such interests. (See Restate· 
ment, Torts, §§ 447, 449.) [3] As the court stated in Routh 
v. Quinn, 20 Ca1.2d 488, 491 [127 P.2d I, 149 A.L.R. 215], 
however, "It is an elementary principle that an indispensable 
factor to liability founded upon negligence is the existence 
of a duty of care owed by the alleged wrongdoer to the person 
injured, or to a class of which he is a member." (See also 
McEvoy v. American Pool Oorp., 32 Ca1.2d 295, 298 [195 
\ P.2d 783] ; Rest., Torts, § 281 (a), (b), comments c, e, g.) 
Accordingly, it is necessary to consider the scope of the duty 
of the owner of an automobile to control his property for 
the protection of persons on the public streets. 
Given a statute prohibiting the leaving of the key in an 
unattended vehicle on the public street, it could reasonably 
be contended that the Legislature had established a duty on 
the part of motorists to protect persons on the streets from 
any damage caused by thieves driving stolen automobiles. 
(See ROBB v. Hartman, 78 App.D.C. 217 [139 F.2d 14, 15, 
158 A.L.R. 1370]; Ney v. Yellow Oab 00., 2 Il1.2d 74 
[117 N.E.2d 74, 77-78] ; Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 Ill.App. 359 
[77 N.E.2d 537, 539].) [4] In the absence of such a statute, 
however, it has generally been held that the owner of an auto-
mobile is under no duty to persons who may be injured by 
its use to keep it out of the hands of a third person in the 
absence of facts putting the owner on notice that the third 
person is incompetent to handle it. (Baugh v. RogerB, 24 Cal.2d 
200,214 [148 P.2d 633, 152 A.L.R. 1043J ; Lane v. Bing, 202 
Cal. 590, 592 [262 P. 318] ; Perry v. Sime<m6, 197 Cal. 132, 
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1:.J8 [23!l P. 1056\; Illtl·/kr v. 1,C1'(,lIs/atl/. l!"H) Cal. 681, 688 
fiR9 [2]4 r. 42) ; MrCnJla v. Grn.~.~e, 12 CIlI.App.2d 546, 550 
[109 P.2d 358]; Brown v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 39 Cal.App. 
738, 741 [179 P. 697]. See also Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc .. 122 
Ind.App.587 [106 N.E.2d 395,398] ; Castay v. Katz & Best-
hoff, Ltd., (La.App.) 148 So. 76, 78; Galbraith v. Levin, 323 
Mass. 255 [81 N.E.2d 560, 564]; Anderson v. Theisen, 231 
Minn. 369 [43 N.W.2d 272, 273] ; c/., Johnstone v. Panama 
Pac. I. E. Co., 187 Cal. 323, 329-330 [202 P. 34]; Rest., 
Torts, § 390.) 
Plaintiff contends, however, that since both theft and 
negligent driving on the part of the thief were foreseeable 
consequences of leaving the key in the car, Mrs. Stanley 
created an unreasonable risk to persons on the streets and 
was therefore negligent toward him. He relies upon N ey v. 
Yellow Cab Co., 2 Hl.2d 74 [117 N.E.2d 74, 79], where 
the court stated: "The increase in population and number 
of motor vehicles owned and operated in this country in the 
past few years is well known. The increase of casualties from 
traffic accidents is a matter of common knowledge and con-
cern. The incidence of automobile thefts and damages and 
injuries resulting from such larcenous escapades has accord-
ingly increased. Juvenile delinquency has reached propor-
tions alarming to everyone. Three major wars during the 
lifetime of this generation have had their effect upon the 
mental attitudes, not only upon those who endured the 
physical suffering and mental anguish, but upon all our 
society. Comparative regard and disregard for the rights 
and property of others have not been unaffected. Automobiles, 
once considered a luxury, are now considered by many to be 
a necessity. The man who once walked a mile now drives a 
block. The speed and power of automobiles have increased 
to the extent that safety experts are now showing keen 
awareness of their potentials even in the hands of rightful 
owners and careful operators. Incidents of serious havoc 
caused by runaway thieves or irresponsible juveniles in stolen 
or 'borrowed' motor vehicles frequently shock the readers 
of the daily press. With this background must come a recogni-
tion of the probable danger of reSUlting injury consequent 
to permitting a motor vehicle to become casily available to 
an unauthorized person through violation of the statute in 
question. " These considerations were nndonbtedly persua-
sivl' in motivating the Illinois Legislature to paAA a statute 
prohibiting owners from leaving keys in their unattended 
) 
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\'phi('lf'N alld in lI'adill:.! tI ... IlIillfllN ~IIIII·I'II.W I 'UIII"I. to f'on 
stru(' tllf' Nfalutf' II" fill" illl(,IId,'" for thc'llO'lwtil fit' 11f'I"NOnli who 
might be illjlll"rrl by thr op('ration of stolrn ears. In the 
absence of statute, howe\'er, we do not feel that they justify 
the recognition ofa duty on the part of car owners to protl'ct 
the public from till' risk of the motoring activities of thieves, 
when to do so would result in imposing greater liability than 
is now provided by statutI' when the owner voluntarily en· 
trusts his car to another. (S(>e Veh. Code, § 402.) 
The problem is not answered by pointing out that there is a 
foreseeable risk of negligent driving on the part of thievl's. 
[5] There is a fore~eable risk of negligent driving whenever 
anyone drives himself or lends his car to another. That risk 
has not been considered so unreasonable, however, that an 
ownl'r is negligent merely because he drives himself, or lends 
his car to another, in the absence of knowledge on his part of 
his own or the other's incompetence. Moreover, by leaving 
t.he key in the car the owner does not assure that it will be 
driven, as he does when he lends it to another. At most he 
creates a risk that it will be stolen and driven. The risk that 
it will be negligently driven is thus materially less than in 
the case in which the owner entrusts his car to another for 
the very purpose of the latter's use. 
In one sense the problem presented involves the duty of 
the owner of an automobile so to manage it as not to create 
an unreasonable risk of harm to others. It bears emphasis, 
howeyer, that when Mrs. Stanley left the car it was in a 
position where it could harm no one, and no harm occurred 
until it had been taken by a thief. Thus a duty to prevent 
such harm would involve more than just the duty to control 
the car, it would involve a duty to prevent action of a 
third person. [6] Ordinarily, however, in the absence of a 
special relationship between the parties, there is no duty to 
control the conduct of a third person so as to prevent him from 
causing harm to another. (Lane v. Bing, 202 CaL 590, 592 
[262 P. 318] j see Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal.App.2d 310, 317 
[253 P.2d 675] j Rest., Torts, § 315; Harper and Kime, The 
Duty to Oontrol the Oonduct 0/ Another, 43 Yale L.J. 886.) 
Moreover, this rule is applicable even in cases in which the third 
person's conduct is made possible only because the defendant 
has reliilquish('d control of his property to the third person, 
at least if the defendant has no reason to believe that the 
third person is incompetent to manage it. Thus, as noted 
above. an Automobile owner is not ordinarily negligent if 
I f. I, 
a C.2d-l 
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hI' 1(,!Hls his \'.;Ir III Ilnotllf'r; I'x""1-'1 ill "l'rt.ain l>lJl'cial eircum-
stances, a I('xxor may rely on his 1('88('(' to discharge the duty 
to maintain the premises in reasonably safe condition for the 
benefit of persons entitled to such protection (see Restatement, 
Torts, §§ 355-362; Goodmatl v. Harris, 40 Ca1.2d 254, 261, 265 
[253 P.2d 447]); and a supplier of lumber is entitled to 
assume that a building contractor will not negligently selE'et 
an obviously defective piece of lumber to use as a support 
for a scaffold. (Stultz v. Benson Lbr. Co., 6 Cal.2d 688, 
694-695 [59 P.2d 100].) 
In the present case Mrs. Stanley did not leave her car in 
front of a school where she might reasonably expect ir-
responsible children to tamper with it (see Restatement, Torts, 
§ 302, illus. 7), nor did she leave it in charge of an intoxicated 
passenger as did defendant in Morris v. Bolling, 31 Tenn. 
App. 577 [218 S.W.2d 754]. By leaving the key in her car 
she at most increased the risk that it might be stolen. Even 
if she should have foreseen the theft, she had no reason to 
believe that the thief would be an incompetent driver. [7] In 
view of the fact that the risk of negligent driving she created 
was less than the risk she might intentionally have created 
without negligence by entrusting her car to another, and in 
the light of the rule that she owed no duty to protect plaintiff 
from harm rE'sulting from the activities of third persons, we 
conclude that her duty to exercise reasonable care in the 
management of her automobile did not encompass a duty to 
protect plaintiff from the negligent driving of a thief. 
Plaintiff contends, however, that reasonable minds might 
differ as to whether or not Mrs. Stanley was negligent toward 
him, and that accordingly, the question must be submitted 
to the jury. In McEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32 Cal.2d 
295, 298 [195 P.2d 783], the court pointed out that, "The 
conclusion that certain conduct is negligent involves the find· 
ing both of a legal duty to use due care and a breach of 
such duty by the creation of an unreasonable risk of harm." 
[8] When, as in the McEvoy case, the existence of a duty 
rests on the reasonable foreseeability of injury to the plain-
tiff, it may become primarily a question for the jury unles!'! 
reasonable minds cannot differ. Necessarily involved in sub-
mitting the case to the jury, hcwever, is a preliminary de-
termination that, granted a foreseeable >:isk, a duty arises. 
On the other hand, there are many situation!'! involving- fore-
s{'('able risks where therc is no duty. Thus in ROllth v. Quinn. 
20 Ca1.2u 488 [127 P.2U I, 149 A.L.R. 215J, although the tax 
) 
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assessor could reasonably have foreseen that his rlTor ill COlli· 
putation. would invaliilate a tax sale to the purchaSt~l"S detri· 
ment, the court held that the assessor was under no dut~; to 
the purchaser to exercise due care in his computations. De· 
terminations of the duty issue as a matter of law adversely 
to the plaintiff are particularly common in situations similar 
to that in the present case, in whieh the defendant's responsi. 
bility for the activities of third persons is involved. Thus in 
Lane v. Bing, supra, 202 Cal. 590, it was held in the absence 
of statute that as a matter of law a parent was not liable for 
the negligent driving of the parent's car by his minor chilrl 
in the absence of a showing that the child was an incompetent 
driver. Similarly, in Goodman v. Harris, 40 Ca1.2d 254 [253 
P.2d 44'/], it was held that a lensor was not liable to a busi-
ness invitee of bis lessee even though he was aware of a 
dangerous condition existing on the premises, could have fore-
seen injury to visitors, and could have prevented the con-
tinuance of the dangerous condition by canceling the lease. 
Although in both of the foregoing situations it would be 
difficult to say that reasonable minds could not differ as to 
whether or not a duty should be imposed, the question was 
one of law for the court, and not for the jury, to decide. 
Were we to hold that it is for the jury to decide whether 
Mrs. Stanley was under a duty to plaintiff to protect him from 
the negligent operation of her automobile by a thief, it would 
logically follow that in many situations where one person 
entrusts his car to another, a jury question would arise as to 
whether or not the owner should have foreseen an unreason-
able risk to persons on the highway. It is a matter of 
,common knowledge that drivers under 25 years of age as a 
'class have more accidents than older drivers and that they 
'must pay more for insurance. There may be other classes of 
. drivers with similar accident experience. Nevertheless, an 
. 9wner is not negligent if he entrusts his automobile to a 
member of such a class unless he knows or has reason to 
believe that the driver is incompetent, and in the absence of 
aueb knowledge he is under no common-law duty to protect 
third persons from possible misconduct on the part of the 
driver. (Lane v. Bing, supra, 202 Cal. 590, 592; Baugh v. 
Bogers, supra, 24 Ca1.2d 200, 214; see also Leo v. Dunham. 
41 Ca1.2d 712, 715 [264 P.2d 1] ; RodabaulJh v. Teku.~, 39 Cal. 
2d 290,294 [246 P.2d 663].) 
,It is true that the problem of proterting persons on the 
,~:bliC highways from the negligent operation of automobiles 
.~. 
i,':" 
.f. 
) 
RICHARDS V. STAXLEY l4~ C.2d 
by financially irresponsible persons is less arute when the car 
is bcing drh'en with the permission of the owner than when 
it is being driven by a thief. In the former case negligence 
is imputed to the owner under section 402 of the Vehicle 
Code. Since the liability under section 402 is limited in 
amount, however, the problem of whether or not the owner 
is also under a common-law duty in the case of permissive 
use is not eliminated by the statute. Moreover. we could not 
avoid that problem 'here by adopting a special rule applicable 
only to the liability of owners of stolen automobiles without 
creating an anomalous situation with respect to the limits of 
liability. If such a rule were adopted, a person whose car was 
stolen would be subject to unlimited liability, although a 
person who entrusted his car to another would be protected 
by the $5,000 and $10,000 limits set forth in section 402. 
This result would follow although the risk created by the 
owner I)f the stolen car by leaving the key therein was ma-
terially less than that created by the owner who gave per· 
mission to another to use his car. These considerations sug· 
gest that the basic problem is really not one of negligence 
on the part of the owner, but rather whether or not the 
hazards inherent in the use of automobiles are so great that 
liability should be imposed on the owner without fault for 
any damage done by the operation of his vehicle. The Legis-
lature has imposed such liability within limits by providing 
that the negligence of a driver using an automobile with the 
express or implied consent of the owner shall be imputed to 
the owner. If it is to be extended further it is for the 
Legislature and not for the court to do so. 
There is nothing in McEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32 
Ca1.2d 295 [195 P.2d 783], and Benton v. Sloss, 38 Ca1.2d 
399 [240 P.2d 575], contrary to our conclusion here. Those 
cases both held that the negligent driving on the part of a 
third person that caused a collision was not such an unfore-
seeable intervening cause as would relieve the defendant of 
liability for his own negligence toward the plaintiff, which 
also contributed to the injury. There is a clear distinction, 
however, between the problem of foreseeability of intervening 
causes in determining whether the defendant's conduct was 
the proximate cause of an injury, and the problem of fore-
seeability in determining whether the defendant was negligent 
at all. In the latter case the problem is whether or not the 
defendant's conduct was wrongful toward the plaintiff, while 
in the former it is whether he should be relieved of responsi-
) 
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bilit.\' fl)r all atllllifff'("\ wrOllg brl'<lnsr allotl!rl":-\ wl'''"~ful (~()n· 
duct also cOlltl'iblll!~d to thl~ injury. Tlw diffl'rclI(,p in treat.· 
ment of these two problems is aptly illustrated by comparing 
the rule recently restated in Leo v. Dunham, 41 Cal.2d 712, 
715 [264 P.2dl), with the rule applied in the McEvoy and 
Benton cases. In the Leo case the court in discussing the 
negligence issue stated: .,. The general rule is that every 
person has a right to presume that every other person will 
perform his duty and obey the law, and in the absence of 
reasonable grounds to think otherwise it is not negligent to 
/lSsume that he is not exposed to danger which comes to him 
only from violation of law or duty by such other person.' 
(Harris v. Johnspn, 174 Cal. 55, 58 [161 P. 1155, Ann. Cas. 
1918E 560, L.R.A. 1917C 477] ... )" (See also Rodabaugh 
v. Tek1tS, supra, 39 Cal.2d 290, 294; Rest. Torts, §§ 433,447. 
4.49.) Thus, although it is clear that under the rule of the 
McEvoy and Benton cases, Mrs. Stanley would not be relieved 
from liability by the intervening negligent driving of the 
thief were she under a duty to protect plaintiff from injury 
from that source, since no such duty exists, no problem of 
intervening causation arises. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the judgment on the ground 
that defendant was not bound to anticipate that any person 
t would steal her car or commit any other crime in respect 
, to it, and, accordingly, defendant owed no duty to anyone 
growing out of the unlawful taking and operation of the 
vehicle. 
...... SPENCE, J.-I dissent. 
I' In my opinion, the complaint was sufficient to state. a 
, 'Cause of action for negligence without reference to the alleged 
:violation of the ordinance, and the trial court therefore erred 
. in granting the motion to exclude any evidence and in grant· 
',.ing the motion for nonsuit without taking any evidence. 
. It was alleged in the complaint that defendant Mary Stanley, 
at about 5 :30 p. m. on the day of the accident, left her auto· 
mobile "unattended and unlocked with the ignition key ill 
I~aid car lock" on "Stevenson Street, west of Second Street" 
in San Francisco; and that "by reason of the carelessness 
;' ,and negligent action of the saiel drfrndant, Mary Stanley, in 
, leaving the aforesaid automobile unattended on a public 
70 RrcnARDS v. STANLF.Y 
st I" "I' t , 111110c](cd, with IlII' l,<,y in said lod, ... the' .h'feudallt 
Hnlll'rt J. Rawlillgs was tlwl"eby induced to and did, entpl' 
said automobile and drove it frol1l its parked place over vari-
ous streets" ill San Francisco "in a careless and negligent 
manner to the point of impact ... " with plaintiff 's vehicl~. 
It was further alleged that the collision occurrc-d at Arm~' 
Street and Potrero A venue in San Francicco at about 5 :4S 
p. m. of said day, and that defendant Rawlings then and 
there so carelessly and negligently operated said automobile 
as to cause said collision; and that by reason of "the afore· 
said carelessness ami negligence of the defendants and each 
of them" serious injuries were inflicted upon plaintiff. 
The charging allegations of the complaint therefore appear 
sufficient as against defendant Mary Stanley, unless it llIay be 
said as a matter of law that they were insufficient to show a 
violation by defendant Mary Stanley of a duty of care owing 
to persons lawfully using the streets, or unless it may be said 
as a matter of law that, assuming a showing of a violation of 
a duty of care toward persons lawfully using the streets, they 
were insufficient to show that such violation was a proximate 
cause of the injuries to plaintiff. I do not believe that it may 
be said as a matter of law that said allegations were insuffi-
cient in either respect. Under these circumstances, the motion 
to exclude all evidence should have been denied and the 
motion for nonsuit should not have been entertained until 
plaintiff had had the opportunity to present his case. Then, 
if the evidence presented showed a situation upon which 
reasonable minds could differ upon these issues, the motion 
for nonsuit should have been denied and the issues should 
have been presented to the jury under appropriate instruc-
tions. 
There is a conflict of authority on the general subject 
under discussion in the various jurisdictions. (See cases 
collected: Annos. 26 A.L.R. 912; 158 A.L.R. 1374.) Thus, 
the owner of a negligently parked car has been absolved from 
liability for damages arising from a thief's negligent driving 
of the car into plaintiff's vehicle, upon the theory that the 
thief's act was the proximate cause of the accident and the 
car owner's original negligence was too remote to be con-
nected as a cause therewith. (Kiste v. Red Cab., Inc., 122 
Ind.App. 587 [106 N.E.2d 395] ; Castay v. Katz &- Besthoff, 
Ltd., (La.App.) 148 So. 76; Galbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass. 255 
[81 N.E.2d 560]; A.ndcrson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369 [43 
N.W.2d 272] j Reti v. Vaniska, Inc., 14 N.J. Super. 94 [81 A.2d 
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377]; Wilson v. Harrington, 269 App.Div. 891 [56 N.\' ~:!.] 
157], af/'. 295 N.Y. 667 [65 N.E.2d 101].} In similar (·it'I·lIl1l-
stances the contrary has been held upon the premise tliat 
there may be a plurality of causes cooperating to prodllel' 
plaintiff's injuries, each of which is sufficient to permit It 
jury to impose liability. (Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 IlI.App 
359 [77 N.E.2d 537] ; Ney v. Yellow Oab 00.,348 Ill.App 161 
[l08 N.E.2d 508] ; Morris v. Bolling, 31 Tenn.App. 577 [218 
S.W.2d 754] ; Ross v. Hartman, 78 U.S.App.D.C. 217 [139 
F.2d 14, 158 A.L.R. 1370], cert. den. 321 U.S. 790 [64 S.Ct. 
790,88 L.Ed. 1080] ; Schaff v. R. W. Olaxton, Inc., 79 U.S,App. 
D.C. 207 [144 F.2d 532] ; R. W. Olaxton, Inc. v. Schaff, 83 
U.S.App.D.C.217 [169 F.2d 303].) 
In RoSl v. Hartman (1943), supra, the owner's employee 
violated an ordinance when he left the automobile parked 
on the street with the key in the ignition switch. Such viola-
tion was deemed negligence per ae and constituted the proxi-
mate cause of the injuries to plaintiff, requiring the owner 
of the car to respond in damages though the theft of the car 
and its negligent operation by the thief had intervened. In 
80 holding the court expressly overruled its contrary decision 
made 27 years previously (Squires v. Brooks, 44 App.D.C. 
320), which had held that the intervening act of a third person 
who steals a car absolves the driver who left the keys in the 
car from responsibility for a resulting accident. Such decision, 
the court said at page 14 (139 F.2d), could not be recon-
ciled "with facts which have become clearer and principles 
which have become better established than they were in 1916." 
While in the Ross case the court gave controlling effect to the 
ordinance as a safety measure designed to prevent children 
and thieves from tampering with an unlocked vehicle, the 
court, in passing on the problem, pertinently added at page 
15 [139 F.2d]: "Everyone knows now that children and 
thieves frequently cause harm by tampering with unlocked 
cars. The danger that they will do so on a particular occasion 
may be slight or great, In the absence of an ordinance, there-
fore, leaving a car unlocked might not be negligent in some 
circumstances, although in other circumstances it might be 
both negligent and a legal or • proximate' cause of a resulting 
occident." (Emphasis added.) 
Then in Schaff v. R. W. Claxton, Inc. (1944), supra, 144 
F.2d 532, the same court followed its reasoning in the Ross 
case, though it did not involve a violation of the ordinance 
through leaving an unlocked car on the street-a .. public 
) 
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place." Rather the driver parked the car in a l'Clitaurunt'li 
., private parking space," with the key Idt in the ignition 
switch. A stranger drove off with the car aud injun'd thc 
plaintiffs. Although there was no applicable OrUillltllcC. it 
was held that it was a question of fact for the jury as to 
whether the negligence of the original driver, combined with 
that of the thief, under the circumstances, was the" proximatl' 
cause of the accident." (P. 533 [144 F.2d}.) (In accord: 
R. W. Claxton, Inc. v. Schaff (1948), supra, 169 F.2d 303. 
cert. den. 335 U.S. 871 (69 S.Ct. 168. 93 L.Ed. 415).) 
In Illinois there is a split of authority on the subject. There, 
as in the District of Columbia, the liability of the owner for 
damages by reason of the negligent operation of his car by 
a thief is predicated upon the violation of an ordinance setting 
up the statutory standard of care to be expected of a reason· 
ably prudent man in parking his car. However, contrary to 
the rule of the Ross case, in Illinois violation of the ordinance 
is not deemed negligence per 8e in fixing the owner's conduct 
as the" legal cause" of the harm to plaintiff. but is only prima 
facie evidence of negligence. (Johnson v. Pendergast, 308 
Ill. 255 [139 N.E. 407].) Whether the primary negligence 
of the owner of the car is the proximate cause of the accident 
is governed by the customary rule in tort cases. (Ostergard 
v. Frisch (1948), supra, 77 N.E.2d 537, 541.) ThllS in the 
Ostergard case it was held that the theft and subsequent 
ncgligent operation of the car by the thief in the course of 
flight were reasonably foreseeable risks of leaving a car stand-
ing unattended with the key in the ignition switch, which 
risks must be guarded against at the owner's peril. Then 
in Cockrell v. Sttllivan (1951), 344 IlI.App. 620 [101 N.E.2d 
878], the court specifically repudiated the reasoning of the 
Ostergard case and held, citing the dissent in that case, that 
as a matter of law, the thief's negligent use of the stolen car 
broke the chain of causation between the primary negligence 
of the owner of the car and the subsequent accident to plain· 
tiff. However, in Ney v. Yellow Cab Co. (1952), supra, 108 
N .E.2d 508, the court reaffirmed the foreseeability rule as 
applied in the Ostergard case and expressly held that the issue 
of the car owner's liability, or more precisely the question of 
proximate cause. wa.'1 for the jury's determination. Whether 
a reasonable man should have foreseen that leaving his car 
on the street nnattendt'tl. with the key in the ignition" would 
probably result in !'lOtnt'OIW stealing it, and, while in flight. 
driving it negligently into plaintiff's automobile" and whether 
) 
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,lit' tit il'f 's "1"'"pOIlSP. to the Nituatioll "rl'ated" by the negli-
gent parking of thp ear was normal 01' "extraordinary _ .. 
so as to be or not to be the proximate eause of the injury" 
that followed were questions of which" reasonable men might 
differ" and so "for the jury." (lOS N.E.2d 511; see also 
.iforns v Bolling (Tenn.App. 1948). supra, 2]S S.W.2d 
754. 75S.) 
The above mentioned split in authority in Illinois has now 
been resolved since the Supreme Court of Illinois. during the 
pendency of this appeal, has decided the case of N ey v. 
Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill.2d 74 [117 N.E.2d 74], affirming the 
judgment of the First District Appellate Court in Ney v. 
Yellow Cab Co., supra, lOS N.E.2d 50S. 
The precise question here presented has not been decided 
in this state. H0w..ever, the subject of intervening acts has 
been considered by this court in several recent cases. In 
Eads v. Marks, 39 Ca1.2d S07. this court said at page 812 
[249 P.2d 257]: "Where the intervening act is reasonably 
foreseeable. the chain of causation is not broken, and the 
original actor remains liable. (Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 
26 Ca1.2d 213 r157 P.2d 372, 15S A.L.R. 872]; Osborn v. 
City of Whittier, 103 Cal.App.2d 609 [230 P.2d 132].)" 
In McEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32 Ca1.2d 295, 298-299 
[195 P.2d 7S3], the following rules from the Restatement of 
Torts with respect to proximate causation were cited with ap-
proval. Section 447: "The fact that an intervening act of a 
third person is negligent in itself or is done in a negligent 
manner does not make it a superseding c'ause of harm to an· 
other which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial 
factor in bringing about, if (a) the actor at the time of his 
negligent conduct should have realized that a third person 
might so act." Section 449: .. If the realizable likelihood 
that a third person may act in a particular manner is the 
hazard or one of the hazards which make the actor negligent. 
such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious 
or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for 
harm caused thereby. " Section 453, comMent (a): "If the 
facts are undisputed, it is usually the duty of the court to 
apply to them any rule which determines the existence or 
extent of the negligent actor's liability. If, however, the 
negligent character of the third person'8 intervening act or 
the reasonable foreseeability of its being done is a factor in 
determining whether the intervening act relieve!; the actor 
from liability for his antecedent negligence, and under the 
) 
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undisputed facts there is room for reasonable difference or 
opinion as to whether such act was negligent or foreseeable, 
the question should be left to the jury." (Emphasis added.) 
In the McEvoy case, Jack McEvoy was employed by the 
defendant corporation as a service man. In making his 
weekly calls for the servicing of swimming pools, he used 
his own car, being paid for its use by the company. His work 
required that he carry in his car "highly dangerous" chemi-
cals as part of the service equipment. One night while off 
duty his car was struck by a hit-and-run driver and over-
turned, the impact causing certain glass jars to break, with 
the result that the chemicals therein burned his mother, who 
was riding with him. A nonsuit was granted in her action 
against the company. In reversing the judgment, this court 
said at page 299: "In the light of the foregoing [the above 
Restatement rules] we cannot say, as a matter of law, that 
defendants are relieved from liability for negligence by the 
intervening conduct of their employee or the hit-and-run 
driver ••• the jury could have found that defendants owed 
a duty to persons in plaintiff's situation, and they cannot 
escape responsibility for their failure to perform that duty 
merely because of intervening acts the likelihood of which 
they reasonable should have foreseen. In regard to Jack's 
conduct in leaving the chemicals in the car, there was evidence 
that defendants failed to give his adequate notice of the 
extremely dangerous character of the liquids and that he was 
unaware that they were dangerous. The jury could have 
found that defendants had knowledge that their employees did 
not remove the glass jars from their cars at night before 
driving for pleasure and that defendant should have fore-
seen the likelihood of such conduct on the part of Jack on 
the night of the accident. As for the intervening negligence 
of the unknown driver, the jury could have found, in view 
of the frequency of automobile accidents, that defendants 
should have foreseen that a third person might cause the 
type of accident which occurred." 
The principles of the McEvoy case on the questions of 
intervening negligence and causation were followed in Ben-
ton v. Sloss, 38 Ca1.2d 399 [240 P.2d 575]. There Sloss, a 
used car dealer, during sale negotiations with a 19-year-old 
boy, Jay Fetters, allowed him to drive an old defective auto-
mobile over a weekend. Sloss knew that Jay had no dri ver 's 
license. While driving in the country that Sunday after-
noon with some other young people, Jay, in an attempt to 
) 
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avoid colliding with another vehicle, ran his car off the high-
way and skidded into a telephone pole, causing injuries to 
plaintiffs, who were riding as guests in Jay's car. In affirm-
ing a judgment in plaintiffs' favor against Sloss, this court 
said at page 405: "Jay's negligent driving was unquestion-
ably a cause of plaintiffs' injuries. Sloss' negligence was also 
a cause of those injuries, if it was (J substantial factor in 
bringing them about. (McEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32 
Ca1.2d 295, 298 [195 P.2d 783] ; Rest., Torts, § 431.) This 
question of fact the trial court resolved in plaintiffs' favor . 
• • • The negligent conduct of Jay did not relieve Sloss from 
liabtlity, for the likelihood of negligent operation of the 
vehicle was one of the hazards that Sloss could reasonably 
foresee. (Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Ca1.2d 213, 219, 
220 [157 P.2d 372, 158 A.L.R. 872); McEvoy v. American 
Pool Oorp., -supra, 32 Cal.2d 295, 298; Lacy v. Pacific Gas 
& Elec. 00.,220 Cal. 97 [29 P.2d 781] ; Opple v. Ray, 208 Ind. 
450, 456 [195 N.E. 81] ; see Rest., Torts, § 447.)" 
In the light of the foregoing principles, plaintiff properly 
maintains that whether the leaving of the key in the ignition 
switch of the Stanleys' unlocked car parked on a downtown 
street was negligence, and if so, whether it was a proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injuries were questions on which reason-
able minds might differ, and so were for the jury's determina-
tion. The fact that Rawlings' negligent operation of the 
ear was itself a proximate cause and was preceded by his 
criminal act of theft was not determinative under the cir-
cumstances. (Ross v. Hartman, supra, 139 F.2d 14, 16.) 
The accident here happened within approximately three miles 
from the place where the Stanleys' unlocked car was parked 
and about fifteen minutes after the negligent parking. The 
leaving of keys in an unlocked car on a public street in a 
city's populous district might reasonably be regarded as 
almost an invitation to a thief to take it, and its subsequent 
negligent operation by the thief in the course of flight might 
reasonably be held a foreseeable risk which the owner of the 
car assumed in consequenc of his negligent act. (Rest., 
Torts, §§ 448, 449.) Any language in the cases of Ra1e v. 
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 42 Cal.App. 55, 59 [183 P. 280], and 
Frace v. Long Beach Oity High Sch. Diat., 58 Cal.App.2d 
566, 572 [137 P.2d 60], indicating a contrary view shonld be 
disapproved. (See H Proximate Oause in Oalifornia" by 
William L. Prosser, 38 Cal.L.Rev. 369, 372.) 
) 
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The general rule of tort liability is applicable in this case: 
that if an injury occurs from two causes. both due to the negli. 
gence of different persons, but together constituting an effi· 
cient cause, a11 persons whose acts contribute to the injury 
are liable therefor, and the negligence of one does not excuse 
the negligence of the other. (38 Am.Jur. § 70, p. 726; Morns 
v. Bolling (Tenn.App.), supra, 218 S.W.2d 754, 758.) Hav- I 
ing created the risk by the negligent parking of his car, the 
owner may fairly be held responsible for the harm caused 
thereby rather than be absolved, as a matter of Law, from all 
liability to the innocent victim of his original wrongdoing. 
(Ross v. Hartman, supra, 139 F.2d 14. 16.) Such conclusion 
accords with the general rule that ordinarily the "issue of 
proximate cause is essentially one of fact" (iVosley v. Arden 
Farms Co., supra, 26 Ca1.2d 213. 219) and follows the sound 
reasoning of Ross v. Hartman, supra, 139 F.2d 14, cert. den. 
321 U.S. 790; SclLaff v. R. W. Claxton, Inc., supra, 144 F. 
2d 532; Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 117 N.E.2d 74; and 
other like cases above cited wherein the question here presented 
has been adjudicated. 
It is significant to note that the majority opinion appar· 
ently concedes that an owner may be held liable under some 
circumstances for the negligent driving of the automobile 
by a thief resulting from the negligent leaving of an unlocked 
car upon the street. It mentions the situation where an un· 
locked car is left in front of a school (Rest., Torts, § 302, 
illus. 7) and the situation where a car is left unlocked with 
an intoxicated passenger therein. (Morris v. Bolling (Tenn. 
App.), supra, 218 S.W.2d 754.) But if any of these situations 
presents a question of fact for the jury, it would seem to 
follow that a similar question of fact is presented where the 
car is left unlocked on a public street during rush hours in 
the business district of a populous city. In any event, the 
result of the trial court's rulings here was to prevent the 
amendment of the complaint or the introduction of any evi-
dence to show the circumstances. It therefore appears that 
even under the theory of the majority, the challenged judg· 
ment cannot be affirmed. 
I would reverse the judgment. 
Carter, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied July 7, 
1954. Carter,.J.. and Spence, J., were of the opmion that the 
petition should be granted. 
